Cyber Recovery Technology (CRT)
The Strategic Blind Spot in US Cyber Defense
Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov prevailed against the massive bold Napoleonic invasion by practicing a superb Military Recovery Strategy, so did Churchill rescuing the troops in Dunkirk. But US cyber strategy leans heavily towards robust defense, discounting the inevitable scenario of being gut-level compromised, if not today, tomorrow. Lacking robust cyber recovery strategy will prove detrimental. The time to prepare is now. BitMint LLC is offering its share. We developed several recovery technologies and related methodologies for the cause.
- Non-Disruptive Credentials Refreshment:
Automatic non-disruptive refreshment of access credentials keep stolen access credentials short lived, and useless. See Nooance.
- Complexity Reduction: Disengagement Protocols:
Pre-marked disengagement lines will protect not yet corrupt portions of the network. Smooth exchange will be sacrificed for the purpose, but it offers the advantage of quarantine -- focus on the infected territory.
- Clean-Core Restart (Skeleton®):
Skeleton® technology keeps a core of the Network secure through off-grid data technology. This clean core is then used to re-build the full network afresh. This technology is further developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratories.
- Extensive Parallelism:
Running computation tasks through two dissimilarly built systems, comparing the results. If the two parallel systems share no software and no hardware components then any gaming of one system will be flushed out and fixed.
These technologies form a comprehensive cyber recover strategy which BitMint offers to its clients through (i) training, (ii) consultation, (iii) system design, (iv) IP licenses
US Patents: 6,823,068 * 9,471,906 * 10,395,053 * 10,445,730 * 10,467,522 * 10,523,542 * 10,541,808 * 10,541,954 * 10,594,480 * 10,608,814 * 10,673,822
Policy makers may wish to read "The UnEnding CyberWar" A serious but high level account of the technology that shapes up modern life.
Highly interactive databases have succumbed to intruders time and again, even when managed by the most security-conscious, and most security-sophisticated organizations. Theoretical considerations have related degree of interactivity and action-versatility with penetration vulnerability. The BitMint designers by their background, are very well aware of this vulnerability, and mindful of the high-degree of interactivity of the BitMint mint, they operated under the assumption that despite deploying the most powerful security means known, hackers may end up compromising the mint. Since the mint is the central repository of coin information, such an event can be catastrophic.
This acknowledged reality has focused primary interest on data recovery technology . These are means to prevent the potential great harm that may be unleashed as a result of failing of the database walls and defenses. The BitMint lab conceived of a fundamental recovery idea based on the distinction between the identity of data and its utility.
In the digital world the identity of data is the the exact composite of the bit identities of the string expression of that data. The utility of data is the service it provides. In the context of the BitMint mint the service is the decision to redeem, or not. Let D be a body of data used to provide a service S. We say D → S. In a nominal database, D is kept at the fast-access area in order to provide the service S. Using BitMint data recovery technology, one modifies D to a derived form D' ≠ D, but such that D' can perform the service S: D' → S. D' (the modified data) is kept in the fast-access area while D (the original data) is kept off-line. The BitMint mint then operates with the modified data D' providing the service S. Namely D' (not D) is used to make the decision of whether to redeem or not to redeem, a claimed coin.
Should the defenses of the database fail, the intruder will get access to the modified data D', not to the original data D. When such a failure takes place, the BitMint operator will resort to the untouched original data D, and derive from it a different modified version D" ≠ D, but which is also not equal to D': D" ≠ D', and install D" for the service of the BitMint mint. The intruder in possession of D' will be cut out of the loop.
For extreme measure the off-line data repository (D) will be further removed from attack by removing the data from digital territory to analog territory. BitMint developed the Rock of Randomness which accomplishes this mission.